C.1

SECRET/CONTROL

097.3
Z1 092
No. 2610

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Research and Analysis Branch

CLASSIFICATION
Changed to
RESTRICTED
by authority of
H. S. Hughes, DRE
By E C Banks
Date: April 4 1947

R and A No. 2610

"No list"

REPORT ON THE OSS (R AND A) BUCHAREST MISSION, SEPTEMBER 1944

Description

A report by two members of the mission on operational intelligence for the Air Forces secured on the trip, with comments on the evacuation of captured Allied airmen and general political relationships.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REFERENCE DIVISION
FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN
REF

2 October 1944

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 USC 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Copy No. 9

SECRET/CONTROL

REPORT ON THE OSS (R AND A) BUCHAREST MISSION, SEPTEMBER 1944

I. FACTS ABOUT THE MISSION

The present report is based on the experiences of two officers of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, who were members of the R and A Bucharest team. This team in turn was part of a broader OSS mission to Romania immediately after the surrender. The mission, planned and carried out in close cooperation with HQ, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces and the US 15th Air Force, had three objectives:

(1) to evacuate captured Allied airmen;

(2) to secure intelligence for the Air Forces on the results of the bombings of the Ploesti refineries, and on future targets in enemy territory; and

(3) to secure general political, military, and economic intelligence from secret sources.

The OSS team included 14 officers and 7 enlisted men. It comprised: (1) personnel experienced in evacuating Allied airmen from enemy territory; (2) five officers from OSS, R and A, who had been attached to the MAAF and US 15th Air Force for target analysis work and were hence thoroughly familiar with the oil bombing program and air force intelligence requirements; (3) several general intelligence officers; (4) a radio communications team; and (5) a field photographic unit. This group was well equipped to handle conversations in Romanian, Russian, French, and German.

The R and A personnel on the mission was: Capt. William A. Salant, AUS; Lt. (j.g.) Beverly M. Bowie, USNR; Lt. (j.g.) Frederick Burkhardt, USNR; Lt. Russell H. Dorr, USNR; and 2nd Lt. Philip H. Coombs, AUS. The senior officer of the

mission was Col. Joseph Rodrigo, Intelligence Officer of OSS MEDTO, who was accompanied by his assistant, Capt. George Corbett. They worked closely with Lt. Cmdr. Frank G. Wisner, USNR, who represented the SI Branch of OSS and was assigned to the task of gathering general military, political, and economic intelligence. It should be emphasized that the present report has been prepared by officers whose chief function was to gather operational intelligence for the Air Forces, and that the following comments on general social, political, and military conditions in Romania are consequently based on their incidental observations while carrying out their main mission. Further information from other officers assigned to cover these broader intelligence fields will be provided in other reports.

The mission was originally planned merely as a small group to enter the country before surrender to secure intelligence. At the request of the Air Forces, this mission was delayed until plans could be made to include the evacuation of captured Allied fliers as an additional objective for the mission. General Donovan, then in the theater, personally directed the final formulation of the enlarged mission as a whole, gave the group its instructions, and made the arrangements for the complete cooperation of the Air Forces with the OSS mission. The delicate matter of the mission's relations with the Russians was based on understandings which General Donovan reached with them.

The team was transported to Bucharest-Popesti Airfield by Fortresses of the 15th Air Force with fighter escort. The first group arrived on 29 August and the second on 1 September. It was not clear in advance whether the initial team would encounter enemy opposition since the existing military situation at Bucharest was obscure. To assure a safe landing, a Romanian pilot working with OSS and the 15th Air Force was sent ahead from Italy in a P-51 fighter to land and check with Romanian

officials. He sent back a "safe" signal and the landing was made without incident.

The team was able to swing into action immediately. Transportation facilities were obtained from local sources; a private dwelling was obtained as a base of operations; and radio communications with OSS-Bari were established to handle arrangements for further air landings and to despatch urgent intelligence reports.

During the following two weeks this relatively small team accomplished results of sizeable magnitude both in organizing the evacuation of airmen with the close cooperation of the 15th Air Force and in securing intelligence on the enemy and on the effects of Allied operations.

Several days after the R&A team reached Bucharest, a group of Air Force officers attached to the AAF/MTO Evaluation Board, under the direction of Col. Grey and including intelligence officers of HQ, MAAF and the US 15th Air Force, arrived to examine the damage done at Ploesti. This group was provided with captured intelligence and other materials already collected by the R&A team.

The following sections of the present report concern the several objectives of the mission: the evacuation of airmen, general political intelligence, and specific intelligence on the enemy and on the effects of Allied operations.

II. THE EVACUATION OF CAPTURED ALLIED AIRMEN

This phase of the mission was carried out with striking efficiency and success under the direction of Col. Kreiger of the US 15th Air Force and Major Ross of OSS. During the two days following the arrival of the initial team, over 1,000 Allied airmen were located, transported to Popesti airport, and flown to Italy in B-17 aircraft of the 15th Air Force. This evacuation was accomplished with the cooperation of the Romanian army and police force, and various local agencies. Over the next 10 days above 200 additional airmen were evacuated

as the result of an extensive canvass of the entire area by OSS officers and 15th Air Force flight surgeons; in this operation a number of Romanians and members of the Russian army gave substantial aid. In addition to motor trips through the surrounding country by Capt. Corbett, OSS, and Capt. Kuhn, 15th Air Force, telephone inquiries for Allied fliers were made to every hospital in Romania.

This search for additional Allied airmen resulted in some gratifying experiences. On 2 September, for example, the R and A team was making its initial trip to Ploesti when it learned from local people that an American airman was in a small hospital at Pucheni, north of Bucharest. A check on this report resulted in locating Tech. Sergeant Peter Tierney of Rochester, N. Y. During an attack on Ploesti a few weeks earlier he had been blown from his bomber when it was destroyed by flak and woke up three days later in this small country hospital. When the OSS team found him he was in critical condition with severe flak wounds which were badly infected. The hospital staff was doing everything in its power but held out little hope for his life. In response to questions from the team, it developed that no penicillin and only a limited supply of sulfa drugs were available. The local doctors received enthusiastically the suggestion that penicillin might save the patient's life. At 1630 hours on 2 September the team left the hospital and returned to Bucharest, from which it immediately sent a radio message to the 15th Air Force, requesting that a doctor be despatched with penicillin and sulfa drugs. Shortly after 1300 hours on the following day -- less than 24 hours after the team had talked to Tierney -- two 15th Air Force flight surgeons were at Tierney's side administering the new drugs and giving a blood transfusion. A 24-hour watch was kept for several days, during which further transfusions were given, and the patient showed

rapid improvement. Within two weeks his life was no longer in danger and he was sufficiently recovered to be moved.

The same Air Force doctors joined OSS personnel in scouring the countryside for other airmen. A number of other badly wounded men were found, treated, and evacuated. Considerable aid to various Romanians was incidentally given at the same time.

Members of the team, particularly Capt. Corbett, OSS, took interest in the hospital at Pucheni where Tierney had been found and were able to give it considerable much-needed aid. Its food problem was somewhat alleviated when the team purchased a well-fatted calf from some Russian soldiers who had appropriated a herd, and its medical supply was much augmented when the team discovered nine abandoned, fully equipped German hospital trucks which they drove to the Pucheni hospital and turned over to the authorities.

Russian army commanders issued orders that full assistance was to be given American airmen in reaching Bucharest. A dramatic instance of the results of this order was the appearance in Bucharest on 13 September of a P-38 fighter pilot who had been forced down close to the Russian lines in western Romania while returning from an attack on Vienna two days earlier. Some Romanian peasants extricated him from his wrecked plane and turned him over to the Russian Military Authorities, who commandeered a Ford truck, provided the flier with Russian guards, and despatched him, with his equipment, to the American rescue group in Bucharest. Two days after the crash landing he was being flown back to Italy.

American airmen on the whole received good treatment during their imprisonment in Romania. Most important of all, the Romanians insisted on holding all of these men as their prisoners rather than turning them over to the Germans. A few Romanian officers were evidently unsympathetic and gave

harsh treatment, but in numerous instances army personnel and civilians went out of their way to do special kindnesses. When the American rescue group arrived, some of the men were in dire need of medical aid, others were in poor physical condition, but many were in reasonably good shape. Needless to say, their emotions were unbounded as the B-17's alighted and taxied in to take them home.

It was highly gratifying and somewhat surprising to find such a high proportion of "missing" airmen still alive. Well over half of the total number lost in attacks on Romanian targets were recovered, including the many who had escaped through Yugoslavia after they were forced to abandon ship on the way home. The return of this large number of airmen has been an inspiration to air crews in Italy and must certainly have provided great comfort to the airmen's families at home.

III. POLITICAL RELATIONS IN ROMANIA

The following observations on the character of relationships among the several groups of nationals in Romania are, as has been indicated above, based on the impressions of OSS officers which were acquired incidental to the performance of different and non-political missions.

A. German-Romanian Relations

Present evidence indicates that German-Romanian relations had been very delicate for a long period and the strength of German control inside Romania was much less than had been supposed. The Germans seem to have felt themselves obliged to treat Romania as an ally rather than as an occupied country. They accepted a much smaller economic contribution from Romania than that which could have been extracted had the country been integrated into the Nazi war machine. The general run of Romanians -- including officials and businessmen -- appear to have followed the policy of yielding as little as possible to

German demands. Even those Romanians who definitely collaborated with the Germans gave considerably less than their all. The net result was that Romania succeeded in withholding from the Germans a considerable portion of the two most important resources of that country -- food and oil. The sharp contrast between Romanian and German domestic living standards with respect to these two items measures the German failure to exploit this ally fully. Even when the need for these commodities was greatest, Germany seems to have felt herself in too weak a position vis-à-vis Romania to force the issue. For example, even after severe interruption of oil production by Allied bombings, the Romanians continued to retain a very substantial portion of refinery output for their own use, and to maintain domestic consumption of petroleum products at a high level. A secret police report, obtained by the OSS group, of an investigation of the slow repair-rate at one important damaged refinery furnished a striking instance of this. The report concluded that the slow rate of repair was the result of intentional obstructionism by company officials who were condemned as "pro-Allied." A check-up by OSS on certain of these officials suggested that the secret police were quite correct in their conclusions. Again, contrary to German wishes, Romanian officials kept the Prahova refinery in Bucharest shut down on grounds of public safety even after the Ploesti refineries were so badly damaged that much Romanian crude could not be refined.

Several other specific instances in which private citizens of government officials succeeded in withholding full economic support of the German war effort came to the attention of the group.

It seems evident that, throughout the war, the Germans had lacked anything like full confidence in the Romanians.

German authorities kept their Romanian colleagues in the dark about important military and production matters. When the Germans developed a radar device for counteracting the measures employed by Allied bombers to confuse the radar anti-aircraft fire control at Ploesti, they kept its functioning and servicing secret from the Romanian flak forces. Romanian observers were much restricted in visiting German war plants. Romanian officials were refused information as to where their oil was being shipped and were apparently kept in the dark as to the general oil position of Germany.

Any sympathy which the residents of Bucharest may formerly have had for the Germans was certainly much reduced by the events immediately following Romania's surrender. Vindictive German air attacks on Bucharest continued for three days and nights. The royal palace, prominent public buildings, and residential property were dive-bombed at minimum altitudes, and hand grenades were even dropped from obsolete biplanes. The attacks severely damaged many cherished non-military objectives and caused numerous casualties. This seems to have done much to wipe out whatever resentment of Allied air attacks the Romanians might have harbored. It is the opinion of the OSS observers that this bombing by the Germans must be characterized as purely vindictive. Even though the German command clearly intended to capture Bucharest, the manner in which German air power was employed could hardly have been calculated to assist appreciably toward this end.

The ground fighting which occurred between German and Romanian forces after 23 August was more intense than has probably been realized on the outside. There was every evidence that in this fighting the Romanian army gave an excellent account of itself and imposed serious losses on the Germans. Both in the Ploesti and Bucharest areas and along the main highway between

them much wreckage of German equipment, including artillery, armored troop carriers, and motor transport which had been destroyed in combat, could still be seen. In the Ploesti area numerous unburied German dead were observed. Romanian and German flak forces in the Ploesti area turned their batteries against each other at point-blank ranges. The Germans were unable to evacuate the many flak batteries they had moved into Romania, and a large proportion, including heavy railroad flak batteries, were captured intact.

B. Russo-Romanian Relations

The period covered by this report coincides roughly with that between the overthrow of the Antonescu government and the Allied agreement on the Romanian armistice terms. Even during this time of almost complete uncertainty there were two distinct phases in the relations between the Russians and Romanians. From the time the Russians entered the country until about the end of the first week of September there was, according to Romanian officials and General Staff officers, virtually no official contact between the Russian and Romanian top commands, except for the Romanian police force. The Romanian government did not know to what extent it was to be allowed to continue to function, its communications with the country and the armed forces were greatly restricted or non-existent, its transport and that of the military was commandeered on a wide scale, and even its police function was uncertain. There was no general liaison or coordination between Romanian army and air forces and the Russian forces.

During this period there was widespread anxiety, in the rural areas and to a certain extent in Bucharest itself, as to physical security. In the country particularly there was considerable looting, rape and, where individual resistance was offered, murder. These acts were apparently not part of a policy, however, but rather the result of break-downs of

individual discipline particularly on the part of combat troops who had found supplies of liquor. Outrages took place against the persons and property not only of the wealthy but also of peasants and of Romanian Communist Party members. Efforts by individual officers to curb such activities were often ineffectual and for some days there was among Government officials the military, and Romanians of the business or professional class an atmosphere approaching terror. This was increased by the Romanian reaction to official Russian action in commandeering livestock, food, and private transport for military use without giving receipts. The implications of total war were apparently new to the Romanians, whose own war effort had apparently not interfered seriously with their pre-war standard of living. Military requisitions seemed to come to most of them as a stunning surprise. In addition there was considerable unauthorized requisitioning or confiscation of transport (including the automobile of the Russian general commanding the Bucharest area) by individual soldiers.

This phase of confusion and terror never affected public order among the Romanians and all utilities continued to function. People ceased wearing their watches and driving their automobiles, and wore old clothes, but shops remained open and business continued.

After about ten days the situation began to be brought under control. Arrangements were made between the Bucharest police and Russian military authorities which gave the Romanians some power to restrain individual Russian troops. Soldiers who were AWOL from the front were rounded up, the troops were brought under much better discipline in the country districts, and the atmosphere of physical insecurity was rapidly dissipating by the time of the writers' departure on 13 September.

By that date it became apparent that the Romanian government and businessmen had begun to be concerned with the longer-term problems of payments of reparations to the Russians, the reconstitution of the country's economy, and the nature of future Russian policy.

A formal liaison was then established between the Russian army and the Romanian army and air ministry, and Russian officers were placed in the main Romanian staff offices to coordinate Russian and Romanian military efforts on the Hungarian front.

Deserving of special mention is the situation of the Romanian Communist Party. So far as could be learned no special privileges or power were given this party by the Russians and some of its members apparently suffered as much as other Romanians from the excesses of Russian troops. It was stated by a number of Romanians that the local communists had been considerably disappointed during the early days of Russian entry because of the treatment given Romanians generally and the apparent lack of recognition of the local party members by the Russians. This may well have been a purely temporary state of affairs, however, and the reports may have reflected wishful thinking by non-communist Romanians. It was also quite generally stated that the Communist Party was not strong in Romania, but this again may be a condition likely to change rapidly under new conditions.

That the Party was receiving special consideration from the Romanian government, however, was suggested by the fact that it was allowed to take over several former German buildings in Bucharest, particularly the Gestapo headquarters. When the OSS group wished to examine these buildings for captured documents it became apparent that the Romanian police did not care to make any issue with the Communists over entry into the buildings.

C. The Romanian Attitude toward Americans

The Romanians, both officially and individually, were either cordial or enthusiastic in their reception of the OSS group and the Air Force party.

A most warm welcome was given to the members of the group by the general population. Friendly greetings, smiles, and good-natured crowds were the rule whenever an American appeared in public. Much of this seemed founded on basis good will and considerable curiosity. In addition there was a simultaneous fear of the Russians and a hope that Americans would protect them and moderate Russian demands on Romania. Repeatedly the group was asked when more American troops were coming, and how many. A rumor spread the first day that 4000 Americans had just landed at the airfield. Hopes were often frankly expressed that the United States would take over control of the country instead of Russia.

In addition to those with such general interests, there were many with individual interests who flocked around. A few proved to be American citizens who wished to leave the country. Many wished to re-establish personal or business contacts in the outside world. Large numbers of the young men kept inquiring how they could join the United States Army or Air Forces. Indeed, five of them with this in view, stowed away on a B-17 returning to Italy.

In addition there were many who sought protection for their property from requisition by the Russians by offering the use of it to the group. Offers of automobiles, houses, apartments, and radios were so numerous as to be embarrassing. The group made every effort -- it is believed, with success -- to avoid being put in the position of being used against the Russians or placed in a position antagonistic to them. It was felt advisable to rebuff critical statements by the Romanians against

the Russians and to make it clear that the Russians were our allies with whom we intended to work closely and cordially.

The Romanian government attitude toward the OSS group was friendly and cooperative in the extreme. Cabinet Ministers (particularly M. Georgescu), and high staff officers, including many general officers, were accessible virtually without notice and made every effort to assist the mission. Full access to intelligence sources including captured enemy documents was granted The police cooperated not only in locating and directing rescued airmen but in opening certain offices of enemy companies to us and permitting contact with enemy prisoners. The General Staff and Air Ministry helped in every way possible to see that military intelligence was made available quickly and easily. As time wore on, however, and it became apparent that relations with Russia were being stabilized and improved and as fear of Russian action dissipated, a gradual tightening up of attitude developed in some quarters. The attitude of "Take anything you want" began to be replaced by a more normal consideration of rank and established channels. In only two instances was the work of the group hampered by this change, but in the future it may be more difficult to secure what is needed, particularly if the government works more closely with the Russians.

D. Russo-American Relations

The OSS group, as was to be expected, made every effort to associate with and to establish cordial informal relations with the Russian troops in Romania. This was felt to be particularly important because of the Romanian practice of distinguishing in their attitude between Americans and Russians. Contacts were made by some of the members of the groups speaking Russian and German, and the others accepted every opportunity to eat and drink with the Russians and to join singing parties in the hotel where both the OSS group and the Russian high command

were quartered. An almost uniformly friendly attitude was encountered, and on many occasions the Russians were enthusiastic in their welcome to members of the group. Some were familiar with the American air bases in Russia and indicated approval. Others expressed admiration for the jeeps and trucks with which they were equipped and seemed to know of their American origin. A number of Russian officers seemed to be much impressed with the US bombing of Ploesti. One with little English but much enthusiasm exclaimed "Ploesti -- Very well!!" with a broad grin and a cordial handshake. Language limitations held conversations to a few very elementary basic concepts, the favorite Russian remark being "Berlin Kaput!"

Official contacts with the Russians concerned primarily permission to examine the Ploesti refineries and defenses. The commander of the Bucharest area was fully cooperative and granted the group permission to visit the refineries. This permission was at first honored, but, after three of the plants had been visited and photographed, the local guards refused admission to other refineries and informed members of the group that written permission would have to be secured from Colonel Blanc, the local commander in the Ploesti area. This official proved difficult to locate. His deputy gave conflicting directions as to the channels to be followed. At one time the group was told that Colonel Blanc could give the necessary permit, at another that Moscow would have to act in the matter, at still another time that the commander of the Second Ukrainian Army somewhere in western Romania was the man to see. It developed later that a special Russian command had been set up to take charge of the refineries and presumably to rehabilitate and operate them. This command was not under the Bucharest area command.

Up to 13 September no effective permission had been granted and the taking of photographs of the refineries and removal

of refinery records had been made punishable by death. It is understood, however, that permission has since been granted to Lt. General Baker and Air Force representatives to inspect the refineries.

IV. SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE SECURED

A. The Sources of Intelligence

The five R&A officers assigned to securing intelligence for air force use devoted a considerable portion of their energies to locating and collecting enemy documents, particularly those relating to oil and the German Air Force. This resulted in what is believed to be the largest single collection of enemy intelligence on these subjects obtained in any theater during this war. Since the material had to be obtained under somewhat difficult circumstance there was a limit to the quantity which could be taken out. Hence every effort was made to screen the documents carefully on the spot and to sift out the most important items. Altogether approximately one ton of documents were removed to Italy, a considerable portion of which contained new items of intelligence.

Most of the documents were rounded up during the first four or five days of the mission; had it been delayed longer a large portion would have been missed since a variety of factors then developed which precluded the collection of the best material The job fell into several phases: (1) locating the best sources; (2) gaining access to these sources (generally through the cooperation of the Romanian Police Department and General Staff); (3) examining and selecting material; and (4) packaging selected documents and getting them back to the operating base. These various steps entailed the making of numerous arrangements and in some instances the employment of special techniques.

The first source located and tapped was the official

German oil mission in Bucharest (Ruminoel). Very few if any of the records of this office appeared to have been removed by the Germans, but those remaining were badly scattered about as a result of street fighting, bombing, and looting of furniture The documents gathered here included valuable information on daily exports of oil products from Romania, Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe requirements and purchases of oil, Romanian oil output by months since 1939, damage results of Allied air attacks and correspondence with Berlin.

An unexpected intelligence windfall was obtained at two Luftwaffe offices; one of these was the German Air Force HQ for Romania, the other a technical office which handled all matters pertaining to shipments of new aircraft and parts to Romania for repairs, and information on technical developments. Here again the records were badly scattered but, on examination, contained a rich yield of new intelligence pertaining to order of battle, GAF tactics, new developments in German aircraft and equipment, repair and production centers, enemy military maps, and general items about the Luftwaffe.

A fourth important source was Schenker and Company, a German firm which handled the bulk of oil shipments from Romania, as well as shipments of German war materials to the Romanian Army and airforce. In addition it was alleged by Romanian authorities to be the center of German espionage activities. This particular office was still in operation, although the top German officials had fled. With the aid of the police, full access to all records was gained and much information of outstanding interest was obtained. This included material of immediate operational significance pertaining to oil and aviation gasoline manufacture and shipment; to the nature of products and the location of companies in Germany which shipped war goods to the Romanians; and to damage to transportation facilities caused by Allied air attack.

It was learned that one Kohlhammer, president of this Schenker office, was also the Landesgruppenleiter (State Nazi Party Leader) for Romania and presumably directed espionage work. The entire contents of his private office, including all papers in his desk and vault, were confiscated by OSS with the consent of the Chief of Police. This material, containing valuable lists of Nazi party members, agents, offices, etc., was turned over to the X-2 Branch of OSS and arrangements were made for further cooperation with the Romanian police in handling counter-espionage matters. This material is believed to represent an unusually good set of leads on Nazi party organization and the espionage system.

The procurement of intelligence at Schenker & Co. entailed certain difficulties because of the reluctance of some officials to talk freely and because the office was still functioning. It was necessary to have the police close the office temporarily to permit examination, and to encourage the employees to talk freely. The OSS group established itself in Kohlhammer's office, with the consent of the company, and secured the assignment of an English-speaking member of the Schenker staff as an assistant. Even after this, an attempt was made to conceal the existence of those records which had the greatest significance, for example, records of the ultimate German destination of Romanian oil shipments. It was necessary, therefore, to conduct a careful investigation in order to unearth the particular type of intelligence which would be of the greatest operational interest to the Air Forces if found. Eventually records of the type being sought were located. The office was organized to tabulate bulky material under the direction of the OSS team. Vital intelligence on top-priority oil targets resulted, which has been transmitted to the 8th and 15th Air Forces.

A variety of other sources was employed, including various departments of the Romanian General Staff, the Romanian Air Ministry, certain other Romanian ministeries (particularly the Ministry of Commerce), individual refinery offices, the Petroleum Association, field commanders of flak units, refinery engineers, and similar sources. One of the most valuable activities was, of course, the first-hand examination of the damaged refineries at Ploesti and Bucharest in the company of local engineers and Russian officials. Numerous photographs were taken to show the detailed damage to specific installations.

B. The Value of the Intelligence Obtained

Although it is not yet possible to report on all the uses of the material collected, since it is still undergoing examination and analysis, it can be said that a substantial amount of valuable operational intelligence has already been extracted and put to work. All of the documents were rapidly screened in Italy by a joint team of RAF, USAAF, and OSS intelligence officers to extract immediately all items of operational importance to Allied Ground and Air Forces in all theaters. This initial processing resulted in the photostating of various documents and the preparation of a special series of OSS reports containing digests of important documents.

These were immediately passed to the interested headquarters, including a large number to the Air Force in Washington Brief evaluations of the various categories of intelligence secured are presented below.

1. Oil.

a. Target Material. It was possible to build up from the Schenker & Co. files a list of the final destination points of oil-product shipments from Romania to Germany and other enemy territory, showing dates, amounts shipped, and types of products. This list not only confirmed past intelligence on

many oil targets in Germany but provided clues to several possible new ones. An important plant at Moosbierbaum, Austria, was definitely determined for the first time to be making aviation fuel and has now been classified as a priority air target. A number of oil-shortage terminals were located and known ones determined to be in active use. The processing of crude oil in at least one coal hydrogenation plant was established.

b. Ploesti Bombing Results. A primary objective of the group was to secure data for the evaluation of the tactical and strategic effectiveness of the bombing of Ploesti. When the writers left Bucharest, access had been had to only three of the refineries and intelligence was still being collected. Final evaluation of the raids is therefore impossible at this time. Some tentative observations based on the information available up to 13 September may be of interest, but they should be considered as starting points for further study rather than final conclusions.

Three of the most important refineries, Astra-Romana, Romano-Americana (the one refinery with a large American interest), and Concordia Vega were inspected by the group on 2 and 4 September. The engineers of each refinery accompanied the party and explained the effect of various items of damage on each refinery's functioning.

All of these plants were unserviceable at the time of inspection. Neither they nor the other refineries, with the exception of Columbia Aquila, were damaged by the Germans.

Astra had not been so seriously damaged as air reconnaissance had indicated, Concordia was found to be in about the condition anticipated, and Romano had suffered more heavily than expected. Intelligence on the capacity and output of Romanian refineries prior to attacks and on the magnitude of shipments to Germany proved to be very

accurate. Over the period of attack April-August 1944 such errors in intelligence estimates of the condition and production of various refineries as occurred virtually cancelled each other out, with the result that the over-all estimate was substantially accurate.

Certain points stood out as a result of the inspection of these refineries.

i. Variations in the construction of refineries may call for variations in the point of attack and in certain cases damage to installations normally considered of secondary importance may be highly effective.

. Romano-Americana was knocked out by bombs which apparently landed harmlessly in open spaces but in fact wrecked the sewer system of which the circulation of cooling water depended. At the same refinery destruction of a cooling tower stopped operation of the main distillation unit while at Astra similar damage had been unimportant because alternative cooling arrangements could be provided. Again, continuing damage to refinery loading-sidings substantially reduced shipments of finished products from the refineries.

ii. Partial damage to vital installations may prove to be of small effect.

Direct hits on boiler houses, shell still batteries, and distillation units succeeded in knocking out only a few of a number of parallel units. The others were put back into operation with relative ease, and production was reduced but not halted.

iii. Short fusing may minimize bomb damage.

In at least two cases (both at Astra-Romana) bombs were exploded by roof or overhead pipes of the main boiler house and the main distillation unit, in a position where damage was confined to roof or superstructure and the

foundations and vital equipment escaped damage. A longer fuse would have carried the bombs to a point where explosion would have caused vital damage.

iv. Recuperative powers of even such integrated plants as refineries are very great, and repeated bombing is warranted and required until a number of vital installations have been completely destroyed.

In a modern plant there is a good deal of reserve capacity in the vital installations. It is therefore necessary to destroy these completely. Until this has been done, there can be little question of bombing to excess.

v. The Ploesti attacks seriously reduced German oil supplies.

Records of shipments of processed products to Germany and to the Wehrmacht were secured by the OSS group at the offices of the German Oil Mission (Ruminol). The average of these shipments during the five months when the Ploesti refineries were under attack was only 38 percent of the average for the first three months of 1944. Before the raids Ploesti accounted for about 30 percent of total German oil resources.

2. Aircraft. Several German aircraft log books at the Luftwaffe HQ provided evidence of FW190 assembly at Wismar, Germany, and this information was passed immediately to the 8th Air Force. Other Luftwaffe documents provided lists of major aircraft-repair and spare-parts depots, some of which represent worthwhile new air targets.

3. Order of Battle. A particularly striking example of useful current intelligence was the procurement of enemy air order of battle data by Lieutenant (jg.) Bowie from the Romanian General Staff shortly after his arrival. This intelligence indicated that the German and Hungarian airforces

currently had large concentrations of planes on several Hungarian fields which previously had been unimportant. This news was radioed promptly to the 15th Air Force which made an immediate photo reconnaissance of the fields. The photos confirmed the intelligence and the 15th Air Force promptly attacked, destroying more than 200 enemy aircraft on the ground. This same type of intelligence, as well as official Romanian maps showing enemy ground order of battle, were thereafter passed back regularly to the 15th Air Force, HQ, MAAF, and AFHQ.

4. Enemy Defenses. The enemy's smoke screen greatly increased the difficulty of the Ploesti attacks. Information was secured from the Romanian authorities in charge of the operation of these defenses as to the mode of operation and capabilities which might be of assistance in overcoming such obstacles in attacks on other targets. The fact that the screen could operate continuously for five to seven hours, that humidity increased its effectiveness, and that it could be operated in wind velocities up to about 57 miles per hour seemed of particular interest.

Flak defenses which were captured almost intact were found to be almost exactly as estimated by Allied Air Force intelligence. Overlays of gun positions supplied by the Romanian army showed the batteries in the expected positions. This has provided a useful check on flak intelligence methods.

Information was secured from the Romanian flak commander as to the existence of a new radar device to counteract the effects of the devices used by the Allies to overcome radar fire-control instruments. This device was stated to be almost completely effective, unlike certain earlier devices at first employed by the enemy. Search was made for a specimen of one of these instruments or parts thereof, but the Germans had always kept the instrument out of the hands of the Romanians

and apparently succeeded in removing or destroying all this apparatus.

5. Material of Possible Interest to the Navy. In addition to the information outlined above, a substantial volume of material which on cursory examination seemed of possible special interest to the Navy was secured. Perhaps worthy of mention are data as to destinations, amounts, and kinds of oil products shipped from Romania to the German navy; correspondence and agreements of the German naval mission in Romania; German charts; German intelligence on United States aircraft carriers and carrier formations, and landing craft and equipment; a German analysis, complete with air photographs and diagrams, of the naval and air preparations and operations incident to the Salerno landings; and technical information on a wide variety of radio devices.

C. General

The OSS team represented the only firsthand source of intelligence for the War, Navy, and State Departments on current military and political developments in Romania following the capitulation of 23 August. Numerous reports along these lines were dispatched each day by radio and aircraft. These were mainly the work of Lt. Comdr. Wisner.

This report would be incomplete without acknowledgement of the untiring efforts and highly effective work of Lt. (j.g.) Frederick Burkhardt in procuring and screening German documents, of Capt. William A. Salant and Lt. (j.g.) Beverly Bowie in securing intelligence on oil, and the unusual effectiveness of Lt. Bowie in establishing good sources of intelligence within the new Romanian Government and Army Staff. Their work deserves special mention and highest commendation.

2 October 1944

Russell H. Dorr, Lt., USNR

Philip H. Coombs, 2nd Lt., AU